Working papers



Traditional institutions often persist during the early stages of development, yet causal evidence exploring the relationship between development and their influence remains scarce. This paper provides evidence that economic development can causally make traditional institutions more pronounced, by investigating how a forced port opening in 19th-century China influenced the support provided by patrilineal ties for male marriages. Findings show that certain patrilineal ties become more important after the port’s opening. Males with higher centrality among other unmarried male relatives in their patrilineal family tre have an increased likelihood of securing a spouse. I then argue for a connection between such results and the role of within-kin-group resource allocation. I develop a model of altruism within networks which suggests that a larger surplus from development incentivizes unmarried males to maintain their connections with their kin groups. This, in turn, enhances the importance of these ties. Consequently, disparities within kinship groups widen, with individual outcomes increasingly hinging on patrilineal ties.



R&R, Journal of Public Economic Theory


I develop a model discussing the role that social learning can play in coordinating adoption behaviour in a network. Individuals receive initial signals regarding the value of the product, communicate afterwards and make adoption decisions based on that. In the framework of DeGroot Naïve learning, the model suggests that as beliefs converge in the Naïve learning process, the result will converge to a unique cutoff equilibrium, as in a global game. I then discuss how adoption rates and social welfare depend on network structures. More adoption is expected with high inequality in network positions if the value of the product to be adopted is low and vice versa.



(with Jiahong Han and Jiacheng Xiao)


This study investigates the historical origins of son preference and gender bias in China, examining the influence of rice and wheat production on parents' choice of offspring's sex ratio. We find that provinces/prefectures with larger gaps in rice and wheat suitability exhibit higher male-to-female sex ratios at birth. Furthermore, individuals from regions with larger gaps in suitability tend to have more unequal gender norms.


Work in progress



I examine competitive dynamics among Chinese governors overseeing neighbouring prefectures. I develop a contest model where governors determine their effort levels in response to the efforts of their neighbours. Using tax revenues and investment contract counts as measures of effort, and employing extreme weather reports as instrumental variables, I estimate the model's parameters. Findings indicate that competition from five neighbouring governors exerting similar effort levels offsets one's own efforts.


We are exploring the impact of technologies on delegation decisions within multinationals. As technologies improve monitoring, will companies favor managers linked to headquarters for interest alignment, or favor local managers for their unique insights and networks? Using Orbis data, we have documented shifts in managerial distribution and are investigating the underlying technological factors. We are also attempting to link these shifts to manager compensation and firm performance.


Social sanctions play a pivotal role in promoting cooperation for public goods within local communities. Existing theories grapple with understanding why centarl individuals in kin networks offer more yet receive less severe sanctions. My model proposes that sanctions from moderately distant kin can sustain high cooperation levels, offering a solution to this puzzle. I'm now in the process of validating this with empirical data.